HISTORY: PAPER I

SOURCE MATERIAL BOOKLET FOR SECTION B AND SECTION C
SOURCE A  
An extract from a speech by George C. Marshall, US Secretary of State, at Harvard University on 5 June 1947

It is logical that the USA should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine* but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist …

[Department of State Bulletin, XVI, 15 June 1947, p. 1160]

*doctrine – policy or ideology

SOURCE B  
An extract from an article entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" written by George Kennan, an American adviser and diplomat in 1947

It is clear that the main element of any USA policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant* containment of Russian expansive tendencies … It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no … love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of permanent happy co-existence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure towards the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.

[Foreign Affairs, Vol, 25, No. 4, July 1947, pp. 580-1]

*vigilant – watchful

SOURCE C  
An extract from a speech made by Andrei Vyshinsky, deputy Foreign Minister and Soviet spokesman at the United Nations on 18 September 1947

As the experience of the past few months has shown, the proclamation of this doctrine* meant that the United States Government has moved toward a direct renunciation* of the principles of international collaboration and concerted* action by the great Powers and toward attempts to impose its will on other independent states, while at the same time obviously using the economic resources distributed as relief to individual needy nations as an instrument of political pressure … Moreover, this Plan is an attempt to split Europe into two camps and, with the help of the United Kingdom and France, to complete the formation of a bloc of several European countries hostile* to the interests of the democratic countries of Eastern Europe and most particularly to the interests of the Soviet Union.


*doctrine – policy or ideology
*renunciation – rejection
*concerted – joint
*hostile – behaving in an unfriendly or threatening way
SOURCE D  A photograph taken in August 1961 published by Time/Life Pictures

SOURCE E  An extract from President Kennedy's Speech, which he delivered on 26 June 1963

There are many people in the world who really don't understand ... what is the great issue between the free world and the Communist World. Let them come to Berlin. There are some who say that Communism is the wave of the future. Let them come to Berlin. And there are some who say in Europe and elsewhere, "We can work with the Communists." Let them come to Berlin. And there are even a few who say that it's true that Communism is an evil system but it permits us to make economic progress. Let them come to Berlin. Freedom has many difficulties and democracy is not perfect. But we have never had to put a wall up to keep our people in, to prevent them from leaving us ... While the wall is the most obvious and vivid* demonstration of the failures of the Communist system, all the world can see we take no satisfaction in it, for it is, as your Mayor has said, an offense not only against history, but an offense against humanity, separating families, dividing husbands and wives and brothers and sisters and dividing a people who wish to be joined together ...


*vivid – intense
SOURCE F  An extract from a book written by historian Chen Jian, commenting on the relations between China, the Soviet Union and the USA during the Cold War

China's leverage* in the Cold War was primarily determined by its enormous size. With the largest population and occupying the third largest territory in the world, China was a factor that neither superpower could ignore. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, when Mao's China entered a strategic alliance with the Soviet Union, the United States immediately felt seriously threatened ... In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the situation reversed completely following China's split with the Soviet Union and growing friendliness with the United States ... China's leverage* in the Cold War, though, went far beyond changing the balance of power between the two superpowers. The emergence of Mao's China as a unique revolutionary country in the late 1940s also altered the orientation of the Cold War by shifting its actual focal point from Europe to East Asia.

*leverage – power to influence


SOURCE G  An extract adapted from the historian D.S. Zagoria's, Russia and China – Two Roads to Communism, published in 1961

The ... Chinese-Soviet conflict began in 1957, when the two basic issues arose. The first concerns communism's global strategy. Beijing rejected the Khrushchev version of 'peaceful coexistence' as unworkable. The second concerns how to build socialism and communism in a country already ruled by a Communist party. The Chinese want to go faster than the Russians believe is desirable or possible.

SOURCE H  A cartoon by American cartoonist Mort Drucker that shows President Richard Nixon (right) and Mao Zedong (left) in 1971