This addendum consists of 18 pages.
QUESTION 1: HOW DID THE DETECTION OF SOVIET MISSILES IN CUBA BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA) INTENSIFY COLD WAR TENSIONS IN THE 1960s?

SOURCE 1A

The source below consists of a visual and a written source. It focuses on the deployment of Soviet missiles to Cuba.

Visual Source: On 14 October 1962, Major Heyser went on a secret mission to take photographs of suspicious military sites in Western Cuba. The images on the photographs were identified as medium-range ballistic missiles. (The labelling in the photograph below was added by the American intelligence service.)

[From: The Cuban Missile Crisis – To The Brink Of War by P Byrne]
Written Source: The following source contains information regarding the discussions that were held after the discovery of medium-range missiles in Cuba.

Tuesday 16 October 1962, 11:50

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) chief photo interpreter hovered over (looked over) the president's shoulder. Arthur Lundahl held a pointer in his hand, ready to reveal a secret that would bring the world to the edge of nuclear war.

The secret was buried in three black and white photographs pasted to briefing boards hidden in a large black case. The photographs had been shot from directly overhead, evidently from a considerable distance, with the aid of a very powerful zoom lens. On superficial inspection, the grainy images of fields and forests along winding country roads seemed innocuous (harmless), almost bucolic (rural). One of the fields contained tube-like objects, others oval-shaped white dots neatly lined up next to one another ...

To help the president understand the significance of the photos, Lundahl had labelled them with arrows pointing to the dots and blotches (spots), along with captions reading, 'ERECTOR LAUNCHER EQUIPMENT', 'MISSILE TRAILERS' and 'TENT AREAS' ... Kennedy seemed preternaturally (unnaturally) calm to the other men in the room and listened to the evidence of Kremlin duplicity (dishonesty). In secrecy, while insisting they would never contemplate such a thing, the Soviet leaders had installed surface to surface nuclear missiles in Cuba, less than a hundred miles from American shores ... Lundahl took the briefing boards out of his bag and laid them on the table. He used his pointer to direct the president's attention to a canvas-covered missile trailer next to a launcher erector. Seven more missiles trailers were parked in a nearby field.

'How do you know this is a medium-range ballistic missile?' asked the president. His voice was clipped (irritable) and tense, betraying a boiling anger beneath the calm.

'The length, sir'.

'The what? The length?'

'The length of it, yes'.

[From: One Minute To Midnight – Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War by M Dobbs]
SOURCE 1B

The following source is a telegram (written message) sent by Anatoly Dobrynin of the Soviet Union to the USSR Foreign Ministry on 27 October 1962.

**Dobrynin cable (telegram) to the USSR Foreign Ministry, 27 October 1962.**

**CIPHERED (SECRET) TELEGRAM**

Late tonight R Kennedy invited me to come see him. We talked alone.

The Cuban crisis, R Kennedy began, continues to quickly worsen. We have just received a report that an unarmed American plane was shot down while carrying out a reconnaissance (investigation) flight over Cuba. The military is demanding that the president arm such planes and respond to fire with fire. The USA government will have to do this.

'I want,' R Kennedy stressed, 'to lay out the current alarming situation the way the president sees it. He wants NS Khrushchev to know this. This is the thrust (focus) of the situation now.'

'Because of the plane that was shot down, there is now strong pressure on the president to give an order to respond with fire if fired upon when American reconnaissance planes are flying over Cuba. The USA can't stop these flights, because this is the only way we can quickly get information about the state of construction of the missile bases in Cuba, which we believe pose a very serious threat to our national security. But if we start to fire in response – a chain reaction will quickly start that will be very hard to stop. The same thing applies in regard to the essences (heart) of the missile bases in Cuba. The USA government is determined to get rid of those bases, in the extreme case, bombing them, since, I repeat, they pose a great threat to the security of the USA. But in response to the bombing of these bases, in the course of which Soviet specialists might suffer, the Soviet government will undoubtedly respond with the same against us, somewhere in Europe. A real war will begin, in which millions of Americans and Russians will die.'

'And what about Turkey'? I asked R Kennedy.

'If that is the only obstacle to achieving the regulation (law) I mentioned earlier, then the president doesn't see any insurmountable (challenging) difficulties in solving this issue,' replied R Kennedy. 'The greatest difficulty for the president is the public discussion of the issue of Turkey ... However, president Kennedy is ready to come to agreement on that question with NS Khrushchev, too. I think that in order to withdraw these bases from Turkey,' R Kennedy said, 'we need 4–5 months.'

[From: *We All Lost the Cold War* by RN Lebow and JG Stein]
SOURCE 1C

This cartoon by E Valtman appeared in *The Hartford Times*, 30 October 1962. The caption states: 'THIS HURTS ME MORE THAN IT HURTS YOU!'.
QUESTION 2: HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS NYERERE'S POLICY OF AFRICAN SOCIALISM IN TANZANIA DURING THE 1960s?

SOURCE 2A

The comment by Nyerere below focuses on Tanzania's policy of socialism and self-reliance in 1967.

... It is particularly important that we should now understand the connection between freedom, development and discipline, because our national policy of creating socialist villages throughout the rural areas depends upon it. For we have known for a very long time that development had to go on in the rural areas, and that this required co-operative activities by the people ...

When we tried to promote rural development in the past, we sometimes spent huge sums of money on establishing a settlement, and supplying it with modern equipment, and social services, as well as often providing it with ideas for good management ... All too often, we persuaded (forced) people to go into new settlements by promising them that they could quickly grow rich there, or that Government would give them services and equipment which they could not hope to receive either in the towns or in their traditional farming places. In very few cases was any ideology involved; we thought and talked in terms of greatly increased output, and of things being provided for the settlers.

The fact that people cannot be forced into ujamaa villages, nor told how to run them, does not mean that Government and TANU (Tanzania African National Union) have just to sit back and hope that people will be inspired to create them on their own. To get ujamaa villages established, and to help them to succeed, education and leadership are required. These are the things which TANU has to provide.

...The Arusha Declaration and the actions relating to public ownership which we took last week were all concerned with ensuring that we can build socialism in our country. The nationalisation and the taking of a controlling interest in many firms were a necessary part of our determination to organise our society in such a way that our efforts benefit all our people and that there is no exploitation of one man by another.

[From: Freedom and Development by J Nyerere]
SOURCE 2B

The source below consists of a written and a visual source. It focuses on Nyerere's policy of rural development.

**Written Source:** The following is an account by G Mwakikagile, a reporter for the Tanzanian *Daily News* (date unknown). It focuses on Nyerere's personality.

I remember Nyerere well. Cordially known as Mwalimu, he led by example; his humility (humbleness) equalled by his commitment to the well-being of the poorest of the poor, yet without ignoring the rights of others. And he asked all to make sacrifices for our collective well-being. As he put it: 'It can be done. Play your part.'

His dedication and identification with the masses, and his passion for fairness, were evident throughout his tenure (term) as the nation's leader. When he became president, he worked and lived with them in their villages, slept in their huts, and ate their food. He spent days, and weeks, working with them in the rural areas in all parts of the country. He mingled (mixed) with the peasants so well that you wouldn't even know who the leader was in the group, let alone be able to identify him as president of a country if you didn't know what he looked like. I know this because I worked as a news reporter in Tanzania.

No other African leader lived the way he did, and worked in the rural areas as much as he did, clearing and tilling the land for hours with ordinary peasants. He was one of them and, they said: 'He's one of us.' Not a detached, arrogant leader and intellectual who felt it was beneath him to soil his hands like the poor, illiterate peasants did. I also know how humble he was, because of what I witnessed years before I even became a national news reporter, first at the *Standard*, next at the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting as an information officer, and then at the *Daily News*.

[From: *Life Under Nyerere* by G Mwakikagile]

Please turn over for the Visual Source.
Visual Source: This photograph shows Nyerere visiting a farm in Tanzania. (Date unknown).

Julius Nyerere

**SOURCE 2C**

This source focuses on the failure of the policy of ujamaa.

> Nyerere said ten years after his retirement that he would do things differently if he could turn back the clock. But he remained unshaken in his belief in socialism. As he stated in an interview, 'I would still write the Arusha Declaration. I believe in it. It is right.'

> ... But even such voluntary collective settlements would probably not have provided catalytic (reactive) change in the economic transformation of Tanzania because their main attraction would have been social services – schools and clinics – provided by the government, not profit. The result was economic failure which may take Tanzania decades to overcome. Yet with great achievements in health and education, and provision of social equity, Tanzania’s economy was not a total failure.

> When Tanzania adopted socialism, she was virtually locked in place in terms of economic development, going nowhere. In just ten years after most industries were nationalised and almost half the entire country's population moved into ujamaa villages, half of the 330 state-owned enterprises had gone bankrupt, agricultural production had declined dramatically, the economy was stagnant, and many people hardly had enough to eat.

> James Adams, the World Bank's country director for Tanzania, recalls driving here from Kenya in the early 1980s: 'Stores were empty, medicine unavailable and supplies so scarce that he carried extra cans of gasoline in his car. At one time, the World Bank made more loans per capita to Tanzania than to any other nation. But by the mid-1980s, it was threatening to close the spigot (tap) unless reform began.'

[From: *Life in Tanzania Today and Since The Sixties* by J Ndembwike]
QUESTION 3: WHAT ROLE DID THE VARIOUS CIVIL SOCIETY PROTESTS PLAY IN BRINGING ABOUT CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA) IN THE 1960s?

SOURCE 3A

The extract below focuses on the formation of the Civil Rights Movement (date unknown).

After scattered efforts to repeat the success achieved by the Montgomery Improvement Association in 1955–56, a second major event occurred early in 1960 in Greensboro. Four first-year students from North Carolina Agricultural and Technical College took seats at a segregated lunch counter and refused to move until they were served. They adopted the non-violent tactics and philosophy advocated by Martin Luther King Jr. and previously practised by a then little known organisation, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). Their return each day to the segregated lunch counter, despite increasingly hostile treatment, drew the support of other black and some white students throughout the South as well as adult leaders, and sparked repetitions of their actions in hundreds of cities. Sympathetic demonstrations occurred throughout the nation. The movement proceeded in full force.

The Deep South of the USA responded with massive resistance. Civil rights workers and black citizens were arrested, beaten, jailed, deprived of (denied) their jobs, intimidated (threatened), and killed. The federal government was ultimately forced to take unprecedented (unusual) action to protect black Americans and to guarantee their rights ... As a result important court decisions were handed down, major federal legislation was passed, public facilities such as transportation and waiting rooms were desegregated, and black citizens gained better access to the polling booths.

[From: Civil Rights: The 1960s Freedom Struggle by RL Blumberg]
SOURCE 3B

The source below consists of a written and a visual source.

**Written Source:** This source outlines the experiences of the Freedom Riders.

On May 4, 1961, a group of blacks and whites set out on a highly publicised trip to test a Supreme Court order outlawing segregation in bus terminals. Many of them belonged to the revitalised (renewed) Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), which had tested integration laws during the 1940s. They called themselves Freedom Riders. Ten days into their journey, on Mother's Day, the first bus of Freedom Riders pulled into the terminal at Anniston, Alabama. Waiting for it was a mob of white men carrying pipes, clubs, bricks and knives. The bus driver quickly drove off, but the mob caught up with the bus again outside the city. They smashed the windows and tossed a firebomb into the bus. As the bus went up in flames, the riders rushed out into the hands of the mob and were brutally beaten.

When the second busload of Freedom Riders pulled into Anniston, eight white men boarded the bus and beat the occupants from the front to the rear. The most seriously injured was Walter Bergman, who was thrown to the floor and kicked unconscious. He suffered a stroke as a result of the beating and was confined to a wheelchair for life.

[From: *The Civil Rights Movement And The Legacy of Martin Luther King Jr* by G Puckrein]

Please turn over for the Visual Source.
Visual Source: A photograph that shows Freedom Riders carrying posters while on board a Greyhound bus in Washington, DC. Taken on 4 May 1961.

SOURCE 3C

The source below consists of a visual and a written source.

Visual Source: A poster informing the American public about the march to Washington, 28 August 1963. This source has been re-typed to ensure clarity.

Mathew Ahmann  Joachim Prinz
Eugene Carson Blake  A Philip Randolph
James Farmer  Walter Reuther
Martin Luther King Jr.  Roy Wilkens
John Lewis  Whitney Young

Appeal to you to

MARCH on
WASHINGTON
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 28, 1963

We Demand:
- Meaningful Civil Rights Legislation
- Massive Federal Works Program
- Full and Fair Employment
- Decent Housing
- The Right to Vote
- Adequate Integrated Education

FOR BUS RESERVATIONS CALL:
BROOKLYN – UL 7-9200 or HY 3-1671
BRONX – FA 4-5819 or DA 3-8060
MANHATTAN – MO 6-0401

National Office
MARCH ON WASHINGTON
FOR JOBS AND FREEDOM
170 West 130 Street  .  New York 27, N.Y.  .  F1 8-1900

Cleveland Robinson  .  Bayard Rustin
Chairman, Administrative Committee  .  Deputy Director

[From: Civil Rights March On Washington by S Ross]

Please turn over for the Written Source.
Written Source: This source outlines the march to Washington where Martin Luther King Junior delivered his 'I have a Dream' speech.

The march on Washington, a culminating (ending) event of the movement, drew a larger number of people to the Capitol than ever before – about a quarter of a million. Estimates are that 20 to 30 per cent of them were white; many interracial northern groups attended. The 28 August 1963 march was a peaceful demonstration, a rally – perhaps an extension of the thousands of packed mass meetings that had taken place in black churches all over America and especially the South.

Civil rights leaders had felt that the events of 1963 required a significant climax. It was the veteran A Philip Randolph, who now proposed a march that would really take place. A main objective was to demonstrate to Congress that public opinion was on the side of desegregation and voting rights and that a considerable number of whites strongly supported these goals.

Unity and goodwill prevailed for the day, at least on the surface, as noted entertainers, black and white, performed and a series of leaders addressed the crowds. The programme was long but the final speaker, Martin Luther King Jr., provided an inspirational ending that out-did any of his previous oratory (speech-making). King marched on the state capital and delivered his now-famous 'I have a Dream' speech, calling for equal treatment for all Americans. As a result of the march and the speech, the citizens of the nation began to put growing pressure on the presidential administration of John F Kennedy, encouraging the president to push for civil rights laws to pass through Congress and become recognised on a national level.

[From: Civil Rights March On Washington by S Ross]
Extract 1: The following outlines Steve Biko's definition of Black Consciousness. Taken from a paper delivered by Steve Biko at a SASO leadership conference, 5 to 8 December 1971 in Pietermaritzburg.

Any man who calls a white man 'Baas', any man who serves in the police force or Security Branch is *ipso facto* (as a result) a non-white. Black people – real black people – are those who can manage to hold their heads high in defiance rather than willingly surrender their souls to the white man.

Briefly defined therefore, Black Consciousness is in essence the realisation by the black man of the need to rally together with his brothers around the cause of their operation – the blackness of their skin – and to operate as a group in order to rid themselves of the shackles that bind them in perpetual servitude (oppression).

[From: *I Write What I Like* by S Biko]

Extract 2: The following is an extract from an interview (date unknown) between Biko and an American businessman. This interview was held before Biko's final detention and death. It was only printed in *The New Republic* newspaper on 7 January 1978 because the apartheid government imposed a media ban related to Biko's death.

You are either alive and proud or you are dead, and when you are dead, you can't care anyway. And your method of death can itself be a politicising thing ... So if you can overcome the personal fear of death, which is a highly irrational thing, you know, then you're on the way.

My attitude is, I'm not going to allow them to carry out their programme faithfully. If they want to beat me five times, they can only do so on condition that I allow them to beat me five times.

So I said to them: 'Listen, if you guys want to do this your way, you have to handcuff me and bind my feet together, so that I can't respond. If you allow me to respond, I'm certainly going to respond. And I'm afraid you may have to kill me in the process even if it's not your intention.'

[From: *I Write What I Like* by S Biko]
SOURCE 4B

This source outlines the arrest and subsequent murder of Steve Biko on 12 September 1977.

Steve Bantu Biko was an influential leader, but in the way he died so pitiably (sadly) exposed the poverty of morality (values) at the heart of the state. Biko, who had eluded (avoided) police for a year, was on his way to Cape Town in mid-August – to distribute pamphlets ‘inciting blacks to cause riots’, police said – when he was arrested at a road block outside Grahamstown and taken in terms of Section 6 of the Terrorism Act, which allowed for indefinite detention. He was driven the next day to Port Elizabeth, where he was stripped naked and held in various cells for the next two weeks. Still naked but placed in leg irons, he was taken to police headquarters on 6 September, where he was interrogated by five security police officers.

On that day or soon after, he was rammed against a wall so hard that he sustained the brain injury that would kill him. (Police said at the inquest that he had banged his head in a scuffle ...) Biko did not die immediately but it was clear to his persecutors that something was very wrong. They called in no fewer than three state doctors, who made false diagnoses to protect the interrogators.

When Biko's condition became grave, and police were urged to take him to hospital, he was dumped, naked and unconscious, in the back of a police van and driven 1 600 km to Pretoria. There, on 12 September, he 'died a miserable and lonely death on a mat on the stone floor of a prison cell'.

[From: Apartheid: An Illustrated History by M Morris]
SOURCE 4C

A poster produced by the Black People's Convention on 25 September 1977. It was a tribute to their former leader, Steve Biko.

[From: *Biko, The Quest For A True Humanity* by The Steve Biko Foundation]
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following sources:

Biko, S. 1996. *I Write What I Like – a selection of his writings* (Picador Africa: Johannesburg)
Byrne, P. 2006. *The Cuban Missile Crisis – To The Brink Of War* (White-Thomson Publishing: Minneapolis)
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The Steve Biko Foundation. 2007. *Biko, The Quest For A True Humanity* (Developed by the Apartheid Museum)