This addendum consists of 14 pages.
QUESTION 1: HOW DID THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION CONTRIBUTE TO THE ENDING OF APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA IN 1989?

SOURCE 1A

This extract deals with the reasons for the changes in the ANC’s stance on negotiations with the South African government.

The USSR was no longer inclined (likely) to support the ANC in its armed struggle but urged negotiations with Pretoria. The decline, followed by the collapse, of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and finally the USSR itself undermined the credibility (integrity) of the one-party state and the state-directed command economy. The 1985 party conference in Kabwe, Zambia, marked the high point of enthusiasm (keenness) for an insurrectionary (revolutionary) approach and of the predominance (majority) of hard-line SACP members in the ANC executive. But the mood rapidly changed in the direction of favouring negotiations and the acceptance of multiparty democracy together with the persistence (continuation) of a largely capitalist economic order. Finally, the resolution of the Angolan situation and the loss of the ANC bases there left no real alternative to negotiating with the government should the opportunity arise. The ANC thus published draft constitutional proposals demonstrating its moderate negotiating stance. The message that negotiations were an acceptable alternative to insurrection (uprising) was conveyed to the townships by the UDF. Mandela wrote to De Klerk suggesting they should meet.

[From: History of Southern Africa by JD Omer-Cooper]
SOURCE 1B

The source below comprises two extracts which focus on the reasons for the unbanning of the ANC and the release of political prisoners.

**Extract 1:** This is an interview that Willem de Klerk conducted with his brother FW de Klerk. The interview focuses on the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990. This was FW de Klerk's response to the following question.

**Was there pressure from outside to risk this leap?**

No. I would rather speak of pressure from inside and opportunities. We had to release Mandela. The previous president and minister Kobie Coetzee and some officials had prepared the way. Mandela had committed himself to peace and PW Botha had accepted it after he had previously relinquished (given up) his claim to the renunciation (rejection) of violence. The insight and opportunity to unban organisations which included the African National Congress, coincided with the logic that such a step would mean the normalising of the politics. Many organisations were in any event busy to promote their image and policies. Besides, the fall and integration of communism in Eastern Europe and Russia created a new situation. The ANC was previously an instrument of the expansionism (extension) of Russia in Southern Africa. When that fell away, the carpet was pulled from under the ANC. Their basis of financial, advisory and moral support fell away.

**Did this mean that you thought that the ANC was now on its knees?**

Absolutely not. We realised that the ANC had wide support and they had to be incorporated into the negotiations. The risk of them being a Trojan horse (ANC being used as a front to promote communism in South Africa) of a world power had drastically lessened.

[From: *The Man and His Time* by W de Klerk]

**Extract 2:** This extract focuses on the reasons that motivated De Klerk to have talks with the ANC.

Finally, the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe symbolised by the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, changed Afrikaner perceptions of their opponents and themselves. They could no longer claim to be the bastion (defender) of Christian civilisation against the hordes (masses) of the evil empire, a perception which their contacts with the ANC top had in any event done much to dispel (dismiss) – and the government probably calculated that the withdrawal of Soviet financial support would emasculate (weaken) the ANC. At the same time, these events meant that lingering (remaining) American distrust for the ANC as a communist front, and consequent support for the South African status quo, no longer had any geopolitical (considering of the geographical and political situation) rationale (grounds). At all events, there is no doubt that De Klerk and his fellows calculated that they could control the process of transition in such a way as to guarantee their own interests, and probably to maintain their rule. It was to prove a mistaken calculation.

[From: *A Concise History of South Africa* by R Ross]
**SOURCE 1C**

The source below consists of a written and a visual source about FW de Klerk's reform policy.

**Written Source:** This is an extract from the address by the State President, FW de Klerk, at the opening of the Second Session of the Ninth Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Cape Town, 2 February 1990.

Mr Speaker, Members of Parliament

The general election of 6 September 1989 placed our country irrevocably (no turning back) on the road of drastic change. Underlying this is the growing realisation by an increasing number of South Africans that only a negotiated understanding among the representative leaders of the entire population can ensure lasting peace ...

For South Africa, indeed for the whole world, the past year has been one of change and major upheaval. In Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union itself, political and economic upheavals surged forward in an unstoppable tide. At the same time, Beijing temporarily smothered with brutal violence the yearning of the people of the Chinese mainland for greater freedom.

[From: *Turning Points in History* by F du Toit]

**Visual Source:** The headline and subtext below appeared in *The Argus* of 2 February 1990. It reports on the unbanning of the ANC.

ANC unbanned

‘The season of violence is over. The time for reconstruction and reconciliation has arrived ...’

[From: Newspaper Archive in the National Library of South Africa]
QUESTION 2: HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS ANGOLA IN RE-IMAGINING ITSELF AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM IN 1989?

SOURCE 2A

This extract focuses on the Soviet Union's decision to leave Angola at the end of the Cold War in 1989.

The key factor was the military disaster that overtook FAPLA (People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola) in late 1987 and early 1988. This convinced Moscow and Havana of the need to reconsider their role in the theatre (Cold War in Angola). The fighting had proved conclusively that FAPLA could not stand up to a South African conventional force alone. The successes achieved by the very small South African force further suggested that even Cuban intervention might not be sufficient to oppose it, unless the Cuban force in Angola were reinforced. That would not only require additional men and equipment but also the creation of the technical infrastructure needed to support a larger force in a country such as Angola.

Moscow and Havana were thus faced with a difficult choice: they could deploy additional Cuban troops with additional Soviet arms and equipment to counterbalance the South African army; they could withdraw the Cuban force and leave Angola to its own devices; or they could attempt to achieve a negotiated settlement that would get and keep the South Africans out. They could not simply carry on as before. Letting their MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) clients go under was not an option that either Moscow or Havana could contemplate. That narrowed the choice: escalation (increase) or negotiation.

... Castro was not keen to deploy the additional forces needed to offer any hope of such a victory and was quite sure that Gorbachev would not be prepared to bear the financial or political cost. Moscow's judgment was essentially the same. The South African decision to deploy conventional forces in support of UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) had thus changed the strategic picture unrecognisably. The Soviets had no doubts that they could outmatch and outlast South Africa in force levels, equipment and manpower. What they asked themselves was whether it could be worth the financial and political cost. In the era of glasnost, perestroika and Soviet financial difficulties, their conclusion was that it was not.

[From: War in Angola – The Final South African Phase by HR Heitman]
SOURCE 2B

This extract is about the conflict between Eduardo Dos Santos, leader of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Jonas Savimbi, leader of National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

Beyond the dividing context of the Cold War, a deep distrust between MPLA and UNITA leaders undermined two peace processes based more on consensus (agreement) and accommodation than international constraints (restrictions). The hopes brought by the 1991 Bicesse Peace Agreement were dashed when Savimbi’s UNITA resumed the war after refusing to acknowledge his electoral defeat in 1992 by President Dos Santos' MPLA, and the latter retaliated by indiscriminate killings of UNITA supporters. The ensuing (following) two years of warfare led to more devastation than had occurred throughout three decades of the independence struggle and Cold War conflict.

As President Dos Santos decided in 1998 to resume the war, Angola became one of the worst conflict resolution failures of the 1990s. About two thirds of the half million war victims died since resumption of the conflict in 1992, the majority due to the collapse of food security and health services, and an estimated 1.5 million people were internally displaced, while 330,000 fled the country.

[From: Angola’s Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamond, 1975–2000 by P le Billon]
SOURCE 2C

This photograph by Jan Copec shows Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA, addressing soldiers after the 1992 democratic elections. They were given instructions to return to Angola’s civil war.

[From: Angola: Struggle for Peace and Reconstruction by I Tvedten]
QUESTION 3: WHAT WERE THE VARIOUS OBSTACLES THAT SOUTH AFRICA FACED ON THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY?

SOURCE 3A

The extract below focuses on FW de Klerk's reform measures after 1990.

On 2 February 1990 De Klerk announced major reforms. He announced the unbanning of the ANC, CPSA and the PAC, the scrapping of the Separate Amenities Act, the lifting of the emergency media regulations and a moratorium (suspension) on the death penalty. Most sensational of all, he announced that Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners would be released soon with no preconditions. Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert asked FW de Klerk what had moved him to make the announcement. FW de Klerk answered that he had experienced a 'spiritual leap away from apartheid' and that he would have been a fool not to take advantage of the gap that the fall of communism in Eastern Europe had provided.

A question that has often been debated since 1990 was whether FW de Klerk had any other option but to take the steps he did. In theory, De Klerk could have stayed on PW Botha's course and continued with piecemeal (little by little) reforms. However, that would almost certainly have destroyed the South African economy and with it white wealth. It would probably also have ensured that the low-intensity civil war would have escalated (gone up) considerably.

[From: Turning Points In History, Book 6 by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation]

SOURCE 3B

This article appeared in The Argus, 6 February 1990. It contained the following headline, 'Afrikaner Tiger Awakens says Conservative Party' written by Tos Wentzel.

President De Klerk could bask in the approval of almost all the political parties yesterday, the first day of a joint debate on his speech at the opening of parliament. Predictably, resistance came from the Conservative Party.

CP leader Dr AP Treurnicht said Mr De Klerk had 'awakened the tiger in the Afrikaner' with his 'most revolutionary speech on Friday'.

There were roars of laughter when he demanded that Mr De Klerk should resign. There was more laughter when Dr Treurnicht referred to reports of a 'Viva Comrade De Klerk' cry in the streets of Cape Town. Dr Treurnicht maintained that Mr De Klerk did not have a mandate for a new South Africa that was open to African National Congress and communist leaders and that he had misled the voters.

The CP is to launch a campaign for 'a free nation in its own fatherland' with the aim of rallying at least a million supporters …
SOURCE 3C

This cartoon by Fred Mouton appeared in *Die Burger* on 10 February 1990. It shows Andries Treurnicht's attitude towards multi-party talks.

**MORNING, MORNING AND HOW AWAKE IS OUR TIGER THIS MORNING?**

**VIOLENCE**
This source consists of two extracts on the process of negotiations.

**Extract 1:** This source focuses on the attempts by the Afrikaner-weerstandsbeweging (AWB) to disrupt negotiations at the World Trade Centre in Johannesburg. Delegates from negotiating parties were meeting when the AWB stormed the building.

On 25 June 1993 the Afrikaner-volksfront (AVF) received permission to hold a protest meeting outside the World Trade Centre in Kempton Park, where multiparty negotiating process deliberations were being held. The careful arrangements set up by the protest organisers and the authorities were comprehensively violated when several hundred AWB supporters, many of them drunk, led by Eugene Terre'Blanche, invaded and vandalised the building, shouting racist abuse and tearing up documents.

It was potentially a dangerous situation: Jan Heunis, a government legal advisor who witnessed the invasion, was convinced that violence, which could have led to civil war, was averted by two young policemen who threatened the mob with automatic weapons and forced them to retreat.

[From: *The Rise and Fall of Apartheid* by D Welsh]

**Extract 2:** This source highlights the need for negotiations in South Africa after the storming of the World Trade Centre by the AWB and the St. James Church massacre in Cape Town in July 1993.

Although shocking and difficult, these two events served to deepen the commitment of the main political parties to negotiations. With the urgency of the situation becoming increasingly evident, the Multiparty Negotiation Process (MPNP) plenary finally ratified the election date.

Under fortress-like conditions at Kempton Park, the various parties engaged in intense negotiations over various draft interim constitutions, the structure of the Transitional Executive Council that would govern the country in the run-up to the elections, the establishment of a Constitutional Court and the nature of the proposed Bill of Rights. Joe Slovo drafted a paper setting out a scenario for a negotiated settlement ...This contained concessions – later known as the 'sunset clause' – that were arguably pivotal in paving the way for a peaceful transition. At the heart of these was the suggestion that the African National Congress accept a Government of National Unity (GNU) for a period of five years after the first election.

[From: *One Law, One Nation: The Making of the South African Constitution* by L Segal and S Cort]
QUESTION 4: HOW DID THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TRC) DEAL WITH SOUTH AFRICA’S PAST?

SOURCE 4A

The source below comprises two sources on the aims of the TRC.

**Written Source:** This is part of a speech that Desmond Tutu delivered at the first hearing of the TRC, held in East London, April 1996.

We are charged to unearth the truth about our dark past; to lay the ghosts of that past so that they will not return to haunt us. And that we will thereby contribute to the healing of a traumatised and wounded people – for all of us in South Africa are wounded people – and in this manner to promote national unity and reconciliation. We want to indicate that those who testify before this Commission will enjoy the same privilege as in a court of law for the testimony that they give, provided what they say is the truth as they understand it, and provided what they have done is done in good faith.

[From: No Future Without Forgiveness by D Tutu]

**Visual Source:** This cartoon on the TRC by Zapiro appeared in the Sowetan on 23 May 1995.

![Cartoon](image)
SOURCE 4B

This is an extract from a testimony given by Nomonde Calata to the TRC in East London on 16 April 1996. Mrs Calata's husband (Fort Calata) was one of the Cradock Four that were murdered by the South African security police.

MRS CALATA: At 11 o'clock I was anxious and unable to sleep because my husband was not yet back as he promised. I knew that he was always being followed and harassed, even when he went to OK (store), wherever he went he was harassed by the police force ... (her husband did not come home). Usually the Herald was delivered at home because I was distributing it. I looked at the headlines and one of the children said that he could see his father's car was shown in the paper as being burned. At that moment I was trembling because I was afraid of what might have happened to my husband, because I wondered if his car was burned like this, what might have happened to him. I started distributing the papers as usual, but I was very unhappy. After a few hours some friends came in and took me and said I must go to Nyami (Goniwe), who was always supportive. I was still twenty at the time and couldn't handle this. When I got to Nyami's place, Nyami was crying terribly and this affected me also (sobbing).

MR SMITH: Mr Chairman, may I request the Commission to adjourn maybe for a minute, I don't think the witness is in a condition to continue at the present moment.

CHAIRPERSON: Can we adjourn for ten minutes, please?

OBSERVERS SINGING: What have we done? What have we really done? What have we done?

This photograph shows an emotional Mrs Calata giving her testimony in East London.

Date accessed 20 February 2012]
SOURCE 4C

This source is from an interview held by Lerato Mbele with FW de Klerk, Roelf Meyer and Cyril Ramaphosa on Interface – SABC 3 on 30 April 2006.

FW DE KLERK: The TRC process was flawed in many respects: numerous atrocities (killings) of the past have not been properly investigated; there was an over-emphasis on the role of the former security forces; the assassination of about 400 top IFP leaders has not been thoroughly probed; there has not been an in-depth analysis of what many would call 'black-on-black' violence. These flaws create an imbalance which tarnishes the credibility of the TRC. Furthermore I think the TRC failed to get to the core of understanding the past, or building understanding thereof. There is unfinished business, but we must now live the spirit of the Constitution. We must have ubuntu ... instead of seeking vengeance. We should have reparation, instead of retaliation. If prosecutions go ahead, they must be even-handed: there must be prosecution of undisclosed crimes from all sides, not just from one side. I've never been in favour of blanket amnesty, but it will have a tremendous negative effect if we now get a situation that can be interpreted as a witch hunt. We must strike a balance. Prosecution in exceptional cases can be justified, if it is clear that people have hidden the truth of serious crimes for which they should have applied for amnesty.

CYRIL RAMAPHOSA: FW de Klerk uses emotive (sensitive) words when he says 'witch hunt'. The term 'witch hunt' has never been part of the lexicon (dictionary) of the new South Africa. Nelson Mandela in leading this country to unity and reconciliation made sure that there would not be any blanket 'witch hunt' type of process. We are not accustomed to witch hunts; we are, however, as an emerging democracy, accustomed to justice. If crimes were committed in the past, by whomever, and no application for amnesty was made when the opportunity was there, justice must prevail.

[From: Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa 10 years on by C Villa-Vicencio & F du Toit]
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:

*Die Burger* (10 February 1990)
Omer-Cooper, JD. 1994. *History of Southern Africa* (Heinemann, Portsmouth)
Sowetan (23 May 1995 edition)
*The Argus* (6 February 1990 edition)
*The Argus* (2 February 1990 edition)
Tutu, D. 2000. *No Future without Forgiveness* (Juta Gariep)